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COMMENTS
CALIFORNIA RENT CONTROL AS APPLIED:
ASSESSED VALUE AS A MEASURE OF FAIR RETURN
I. INTRODUCTION
California courts have allowed local governments to exercise
considerable discretion in establishing the conditions that warrant
the imposition of rent controls. For example, the City of Berkeley
enacted rent control on grounds that its residents "have a right to
decent housing in pleasant neighborhoods which meet standards of
adequacy at a range of prices they can afford."' Santa Monica cited
"[a] growing shortage of housing units resulting in a low vacancy
rate and rapidly rising rents exploiting this shortage" as a justifica-
tion for its enactment of rent controls.'
The California Supreme Court has consistently held that rent
control ordinances designed to combat these problems are a valid ex-
ercise of local police power, provided that landlords are ensured "a
just and reasonable return on their property."" The issue of what
actually constitutes "a just and reasonable return" or "fair return"
has arisen repeatedly in rent control litigation.' Rent control propo-
nents contend that the California Constitution requires only that
landlords receive a fair return on their investment in rental prop-
© 1987 by Jonathan M. Ross
1. BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, TENANTS RIGHTS AMENDMENT ACT OF 1982, § 2(a)
(1982) [hereinafter TENANTS RIGHTS] (citing the Housing Element of the Berkeley Master
Plan of 1977), (reprinted in RENT CONTROL PROGRAM MATERIAL MAGAZINE, May/June
1985 (CEB 1985).
2. SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA, MUNICIPAL RENT CONTROL ORDINANCE, art.
XVIII, § 1800, reprinted in RENT CONTROL PROGRAM MATERIAL May/June 1985 (CEB
1985). Evidence of a housing shortage, alone, is sufficient to justify the imposition of rent
controls. 301 Ocean Avenue v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 175 Cal. App. 3d 149, 159,
221 Cal. Rptr. 610, 615 (1985).
3. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
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erty.5 Landlords argue that to be just and reasonable, an ordinance
must ensure a return which reflects the current value of their
property. 6
To date, landlords have successfully challenged only one rent
control ordinance.' Generally, their attacks have been limited to fa-
cial challenges which allege that the terms of a given ordinance pre-
vent landlords from recognizing a constitutional return. In reviewing
such challenges, the California Supreme Court has upheld ordi-
nances as long as their terms allow those who administer the ordi-
nances opportunity to avoid confiscatory results.8 In reviewing an or-
dinance on its face, the court has avoided the issue of whether the
"return on investment standard" is a sufficient constitutional mea-
sure of the value of a landlord's property. The court has upheld such
standards against a facial attack if the terms of the ordinance permit
rent boards to set rent levels that allow landlords a fair return.9
In addition to a facial challenge, a rent control ordinance may
be attacked as applied to an individual landlord. To successfully
challenge an ordinance, a landlord must demonstrate that the return
permitted by an ordinance falls short of the "just and reasonable
return on property" the California Supreme Court has held to be
constitutionally required. In reviewing a challenge to rent control,
the court will have to address the issue of whether a return based on
a landlord's investment in property is constitutionally sufficient."
Presently, no jurisdiction has published an opinion defining the
standard by which rents shall be measured for constitutional suffi-
ciency. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the need for a
constitutional standard, yet it concluded that the question would be
best resolved by the legislature. 2 In Fisher v. Berkeley,"3 the Cali-
5. See generally Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 682 (1984), appeal dismissed in part, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985), affd, 475 U.S. 260
(1986); Baker v. City of Santa Monica, 181 Cal. App. 3d 972, 226 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1986),
appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1265 (1987).
6. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
7. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1976); see infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
8. Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
9. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 644, 693 P.2d at 691, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 682; Carson
Mobilehome Park Owner's Ass'n v. City of Carson, 35 Cal. 3d 184, 676 P.2d 1297, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 284 (1983); Pennel v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr.
726 (1986).
10. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
12. Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 394 A.2d 65 (1978), appeal dis-
missed, 440 U.S. 978 (1979).
The court stated "rent control implicates complex economic, social and political issues.
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fornia Supreme Court indicated that it would define a standard
when faced with a challenge to rent control as applied.14
This comment will define a standard based upon the assessed
value of rental property. In practice, this standard will preclude a
landlord from alleging his returns are confiscatory when the prop-
erty value upon which a rent board computes his allowable return
equals or exceeds the property value upon which his tax liability is
based. If the rent board computes rent based on a value below the
assessed value of the landlord's property, the landlord would be enti-
tled to relief.
This comment will first identify the constitutional authority for
local rent control ordinances and review specific challenges to the
constitutional sufficiency of a rent control ordinance. Next, this com-
ment will consider the methods currently employed by local rent
boards to set rents for their applicability as a constitutional measure
of returns. Finally, this comment will define a constitutional stan-
dard based upon a property's assessed value.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Authority for Local Rent Control Ordinances in
California
A rate-making agency may restrict the income derived by own-
ers from a regulated activity. 5 The degree to which an owner's in-
come may be restricted, however, is subject to constitutional limita-
tions. Courts have consistently held that owners of the regulated
industry must be permitted to earn a reasonable return from their
properties. 6
The California Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional
limitations affecting a rent board's authority to establish rent ceilings
The state legislature is better equipped than most municipalities to formulate a comprehensive
approach to this delicate problem." Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 224, 394 A.2d at 86.
13. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
14. Id. at 681, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
15. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 20 Cal. 3d 813, 576
P.2d 945, 144 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1978); City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 490 P.2d 798, 98 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1971); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), af'd, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co., 20 Cal. 3d 813, 576 P.2d 945, 144 Cal. Rptr.
905 (1978); City and County of San Francisco, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 490 P.2d 798, 98 Cal. Rptr.
286 (1971); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 339 N.Y.S.3d 914
(1977).
19871
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
in the case of Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley.17 The court held that
rent control is a proper exercise of local government's police power if
it is "reasonably calculated to eliminate excessive rents and at the
same time provide landlords with a just and reasonable return on
their property.""
In Birkenfeld, the California Supreme Court found Berkeley's
rent ordinance to be unconstitutional on its face because "its terms
[would] not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory re-
sults."' 9 In so finding, the court reasoned-that the rent adjustment
mechanism provided by the ordinance would inevitably result in un-
reasonable delays for landlords seeking an increase in rents.20 The
court reasoned that "[p]roperty may be as effectively taken by long
continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory
rates as by an express affirmance of them."2
Although the Birkenfeld court criticized the administrative
method employed by the Berkeley rent board, the court rejected the
notion that a particular formula must be used to calculate a just and
reasonable return.22 The court found the method of regulating rents
to be immaterial, so long as a landlord received a fair return."3 An
ordinance that will inevitably produce confiscatory results will thus
be rejected by the court as unconstitutional on its face. 4 However, if
it appears that the terms of the ordinance will permit those who
administer it to avoid confiscatory results, the ordinance will survive
a facial attack."
Two 1984 California Supreme Court rent control decisions,
17. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
18. Id. at 165, 550 P.2d at 1027, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 491. The court continued, "if it is
apparent from the face of the provisions that their effect will necessarily lower rents more than
could reasonably be considered to be required for the measure's stated purpose, they are un-
constitutionally confiscatory." Id.
The Birkenfeld court rejected a variety of challenges concerning a city's authority to con-
trol rents. The court found general authority for rent regulation in the "police power" provi-
sion of California's Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 140, 550
P.2d at 1009, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 473), rejected a claim that rent control laws are pre-empted by
state regulation of landlord-tenant relations (Id. at 141, 550 P.2d at 1013, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
474), and held that it was proper for local governments to regulate private relations. Id. at
142-43, 550 P.2d at 1011, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
19. 17 Cal. 3d at 165, 550 P.2d at 1027, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
20. Id. at 169, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
21. Id. (citing Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926)).
22. Id. at 165, 550 P.2d at 1027, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 169, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
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Carson Mobilehome Park Owner's Association v. City of Carson"
and Fisher,27 recognized the possibility that an ordinance, although
constitutional on its face, may violate the constitutional due process
rights of an individual landlord. In both cases the California Su-
preme Court found that the facial sufficiency of a rent control ordi-
nance, as applied to an individual, must be measured against a dif-
ferent constitutional standard than that prescribed by Birkenfeld.28
Similarly, in its most recent rent control decision, Pennel v. City of
San Jose,"9 the court again noted the need for a separate standard to
measure an ordinance as applied."°
Although the California Supreme Court has recognized the
need for a new standard, the court has indicated that it will address
the issue only when it is faced with a challenge to an ordinance as
applied."5 Carson and Fisher decisions. Carson, Fisher and Pennel
each involved facial challenges. In each case, the court found it un-
necessary to define the constitutional standard for measuring the re-
sults of an ordinance as applied to an individual landlord."
B. Specific Challenges to the Constitutional Sufficiency of a Rent
Control Ordinance
In light of the distinction developed in Fisher, Carson and Pen-
nell' if a landlord believes a rent ordinance unreasonably restricts
his income, he has two options for relief: (1) he may challenge the
administrative method employed by the rent board on the grounds it
will inevitably generate confiscatory results; or (2) he may challenge
the results of the administrative method as applied in his case, by
26. 35 Cal. 3d 184, 672 P.2d 1297, 197 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1983).
27. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
28. Carson, 35 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 672 P.2d at 1300-01, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88;
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 681, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
29. 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986).
30. Id. at 370-71, 721 P.2d at 1114-15, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
31. In Fisher the court stated in a footnote, "lilt would be premature and problematic
for us to attempt to articulate, in the context of this facial attack, the constitutional test against
which specific applications of various administrative standards are to be judged. We will face
that question when we review a challenge to rent control as applied to particular plaintiffs."
37 Cal. 3d at 681 n.35, 693 P.2d at 291 n.35, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.35. The court concluded
it would be inappropriate to define the constitutional standard in the context of the facial
challenge it was presently reviewing.
32. Carson, 35 Cal. 3d at 191-92, 672 P.2d at 1300-01, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88;
Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 681, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712; Pennel, 42 Cal. 3d at 370,
721 P.2d at 1114-15, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
33. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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invoking the constitutional due process standard."'
California courts have considered a number of facial challenges
based on the constitutional sufficiency of the administrative method
employed by a local rent board. In Birkenfeld, the California Su-
preme Court held that rent control laws of indefinite duration must
permit a rent board to give landlords an opportunity to increase
rents to recover costs within a reasonable time. 5 The court has sug-
gested two alternative rent adjustment mechanisms to enable land-
lords to recover these costs: (1) an ordinance that empowers the rent
board to grant general rent increases to all landlords; or (2) an ordi-
nance that empowers hearing officers to grant individual increases to
particular landlords.8 The court has upheld an ordinance containing
both mechanisms,87 as well as one containing only an individual
procedure."
The California Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected
the notion that an ordinance must provide a landlord with a reasona-
ble return on the current market value of his property. 9 In Fisher,
the court held that a standard allowing the landlord to recover a
"reasonable return on investment" was sufficient to withstand a fa-
cial challenge.40 Similarly, lower courts have upheld ordinances that
base "reasonable return" upon a landlord's net operating income in
a given base year." In Fisher, the court suggested a "Net Operating
Income Method" (NOIM)' 2 would be acceptable, provided land-
lords' income was not indefinitely frozen at the nominal amount
earned in the base year."'
34. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
35. 17 Cal. 3d at 129, 550 P.2d at 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
36. Id. at 170, 550 P.2d at 1040, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
37. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 644, 693 P.2d at 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The court con-
cluded that combination of the general and individual-adjustment standard was constitutionally
sufficient because they permitted the board sufficient flexibility to allow a fair return.
38. Carson, 35 Cal. 3d at 184, 672 P.2d at 1297, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
39. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 686, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The court stated,
"[wle can state with certainty that a rent control ordinance need not provide for a fair return
on the value of a landlord's property in order to survive a facial challenge." Id.
40. Id. (citing Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners Ass'n v. City of Oceanside, 157
Cal. App. 3d 887, 897-900, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245-47 (1984)); Cotati Alliance for Better
Hous. v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d 280, 288-89, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 830-31 (1983).
41. See Baker, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 972, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 755; See also Cotati, 148 Cal.
App. 3d at 280, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 825; Palos Verdes Shores Mobile Estates, Ltd. v. City of
Los Angeles, 142 Cal. App. 3d 362, 190 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1983).
42. A NOIM approach assumes a landlord's return to be reasonable at a given date.
This becomes the base rent. This rent is adjusted each year to compensate for increased costs,
and, in some cases, inflation. See, e.g., TENANTS RIGHTS, supra note 1, at §§ 10-11.
43. 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
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Although several landlords have brought suit facially challeng-
ing rent control ordinances, only one California court has considered
the appropriate standard for measuring the results of an ordinance
as applied." In Baker v. City of Santa Monica,4" the trial court in-
validated Santa Monica's ordinances, concluding that the city's fair
return on investment standard was unconstitutional because it did
not permit a fair return based upon the "market" value of a land-
lord's property."
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Baker trial
court found that "landlords were constitutionally entitled to cash re-
turns on their property greater than public utility stocks" 47 and con-
cluded that a landlord's property value should be calculated by
methods similar to these used to set public utility rates." Under the
standard adopted by the trial court, "fair return" was based upon
the fair market value of the property on the date controls were
imposed.""
The court of appeal reversed, holding that Santa Monica's re-
turn on investment standard was facially constitutional. ° Although
44. It is important to again stress the difference between the constitutional sufficiency of
an administrative method and the constitutionality of the results of that method as applied to
an individual. The fact that a given method is found to be constitutional on its face by no
means guarantees that its application would be constitutional in measuring individual results.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this distinction between administrative methods
and the constitutional standard as applied to individuals but has yet to define the latter. Helms-
ley, 78 N.J. at 200, 394 A.2d at 65; Troy Hills Village v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,
68 N.J. 604, 350 A.2d 34 (1975). To date, no jurisdiction has published an opinion which
defines a method for determining a constitutional "fair return."
45. 181 Cal. App. 972, 226 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1986). The trial court identified the follow-
ing issue for trial: "Whether the rent control law on its face or as applied satisfied the constitu-
tional standards for 'just and reasonable return on property' as required by the Californii
Supreme Court in [Birkenfeld]." Id. at 976, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
46. Id. at 976, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 757. After Santa Monica's return on investment stan-
dard was invalidated, the city adopted a new ordinance containing a Net Operating Income
standard. This standard was upheld in Phase II of the trial. Id.
47. Id. at 976 n.2, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.2.
48. Id. The rates of a public utility are based upon the value of the property at the time
it was dedicated to public use. But cf. Southern California Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n,
23 Cal. 3d 470, 474, 591 P.2d 34, 36, 153 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1979).
Baker's attorneys argued by analogy that rental property is "dedicated to public use" at
the date rent controls are imposed, and therefore, a landlord's fair return should be based upon
the value of his property at that time. This standard is commonly referred to as the Public
Utility Investment Standard. Respondent's Opening Brief, Baker, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 972,
226 Cal. Rptr. at 755 [hereinafter Respondent's Brief] (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review
office). For a more detailed discussion of the Public Utility Investment Standard, See infra
notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
49. Respondent's Brief, supra note 48, at 53.
50. Baker, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 979-80, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
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Baker's attorneys briefed the issue of the proper constitutional mea-
sure of the results of an ordinance as applied,5" the court's opinion
did not address this issue.
In concluding that a return on investment standard was facially
constitutional, the Fisher court discussed the merits of several alter-
native standards."2 Specifically, the court considered the Market
Value Standard, Net Operating Income Method (NOIM), and the
Public Utility Investment Standard adopted by the Baker trial
court." The section that follows explains why each of these stan-
dards fail as a constitutional due process standard.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEASURE OF RETURN
A. Defining the Value of Property
The issue left open by the California Supreme Court in Fisher
is the constitutional meaning of the "just, reasonable return on prop-
erty" requirement established by the court in Birkenfeld." In the
context of reviewing facial challenges, it was sufficient for the court
to limit its consideration to whether a rent ordinance permitted those
administering it to avoid confiscatory results." However, in order to
review an ordinance as applied to a given landlord, the return per-
mitted an individual must be compared against some constitutional
measure. This section considers alternative methods to measure the
constitutionality of a landlord's return.
Although there is no precedent defining the appropriate mea-
sure of return, two conclusions as to the standard's substantive con-
tent may be drawn from the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Fisher." First, the standard need not protect the landlord from a
reduction of his property value caused by the imposition of controls.
The court reasoned that reductions in value caused by regulation
constitute a taking only when a landlord has been deprived of sub-
stantially all use of his property. Second, an ordinance may not
51. See generally Respondent's Brief, supra note 48, at 53.
52. 37 Cal. 3d at 679-82, 693 P.2d at 289-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 682 n.35, 693 P.2d at 291 n.35, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.35.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 644, 693 P.2d at 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
57. Id. at 686, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. The court stated:
Any price setting regulation, like most other police power regulation of property
rights, has the inevitable effect of reducing the value of regulated properties. But
it has long been held that such a reduction in value does not by itself render the
regulation unconstitutional. Police Power legislation results in confiscatory "tak-
ing" only when the owner has been deprived of substantially all reasonable use
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indefinitely freeze a landlord's return at a nominal amount. The
court concluded that a landlord must receive some relief from infla-
tion in order to prevent confiscatory results."8 Thus, a standard need
not ensure that landlords are compensated for value lost in the mar-
ket due to the imposition of controls, yet it must provide some in-
crease in rents to reflect devaluation of the dollar due to inflation.
The most significant feature of any proposed standard is the
value it assigns a landlord's property. This becomes apparent when
one considers the calculations necessary to measure the sufficiency of
a landlord's return. First, the value of the landlord's property must
be determined." ' This value must then be multiplied by the rate of
return permitted by the ordinance." The resulting figure represents
a landlord's constitutionally required return.6" A constitutional re-
turn is then compared to the return the landlord actually received
under the ordinance."2 A landlord is entitled to relief if his actual
return is less than that constitutionally required.
The importance of the value attached to property can best be
illustrated by example. Assume a landlord purchases a building in
1974 for $100,000. In 1984, the building's value has risen to
$200,000. In 1985, the landlord realized a return of $14,000. As-
of the property.
Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979),
aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
58. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 291-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. The court
concluded: "Although defendants ordinance may properly restrict landlords' profits on their
rental investments, it may not indefinitely freeze the dollar amount of those profits without
eventually causing confiscatory results." Id.
59. The actual value assigned to a landlord's property will depend upon the constitu-
tional standard the court selects. For example, a return on investment standard will value
property based upon a landlord's actual investment. Conversely, a market value standard will
value property at its fair market value.
60. In Fisher the court noted that "a just and reasonable return on investment is gener-
ally one commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having comparable
risks." 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (citing Hutton Park Garden
v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 350 A.2d 1 (1975)). See Comment, Fisher v. City of Berkeley:
Applying Due Process and Preemption to Rent Control Ordinances, 16 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 369, 391 (1986).
61. M. MOSKOVlTZ, K. BAAR, D. BUCHATrER, R. JAVOR & R. SOLOMON, CALIFOR-
NIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE §§ 9.42-9.46 (CEB 1986) [hereinafter
MOSKOVITZ]. See also Baar, California Rent Controls: Rent Increase Standards and Fair
Return, 7 CEB REAL PROP. L. REP. 97 (1985).
62. "Actual return" as used here, is a short-hand form for net income. A landlord's net
income equals his total rents minus reasonable operating expenses. The expense deductions
permitted by a given ordinance will be presumed constitutional for the purpose of this analysis.
Objections to the expense deduction permitted would involve a challenge to the ordinance
on its face. This section is concerned with defining a constitutional measure of the results of an
ordinance as applied.
1987]
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sume the ordinance in question permits a ten percent return on
property. If property is defined to mean investment, the landlord's
constitutionally required return would equal $10,000. Thus, should
he petition for an increase in rents in 1985, the rent board could
properly deny his application. However, if property is defined to
equal its fair market value, the landlord's constitutionally required
return would equal $20,000. In 1985, the landlord could petition the
Board for an increase of $6,000.
The following section will analyze four property value stan-
dards discussed in Fisher: (1) Market Value; (2) the Public Utility
Investment Standard; (3) the Return on Investment Standard; and
(4) the Net Operating Income Method.6" For reasons to be ex-
plained, each is inappropriate as a constitutional measure of returns.
This comment concludes by recommending a standard based on the
value assigned property for tax purposes.
1. The Market Value Standard
In Fisher, the California Supreme Court rejected the peti-
tioner's contention that a rent ordinaice must provide for a return
based on fair market value to survive a facial challenge. 4 The same
factors that led the Fisher court to reject market value as a required
administrative method compel its rejection as a constitutional mea-
sure of fair return.
The Fisher court rejected the Market Value Standard because
of its circular reasoning. The court reasoned that:
Value is determined by rental income, the amount of which is,
in turn, set according to value. . . . Use of market value as a
constitutional standard would thoroughly undermine rent con-
trol, since the use of uncontrolled income potential to determine
value would result in the same rents as those which would be
charged in the absence of regulation. 6
The Market Value Standard was rejected in New Jersey66 and Mas-
sachusetts' 7 for similar reasons.
The Market Value Standard has also been criticized for perpet-
63. 37 Cal. 3d at 679-82, 693 P.2d at 289-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710-12.
64. Id. at 692, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
65. Id. at 711 n.33, 693 P.2d at 290 n.33, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 680 n.33 (citing Cotati, 148
Cal. App. 3d 280, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1983)).
66. Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 200, 394 A.2d at 65.
67. Niles v. Boston Rent Control Admin., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 374 N.E.2d 296
(1978); see generally Comment, Rent Control and Landlord's Property Rights: The Reasona-
ble Return Doctrine Revisited, 33 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 165, 184-91 (1980).
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uating artificially inflated rents." To the extent that inflated rents
are due to an imbalance in the rental market, a standard that bases
value on an imbalanced market defeats the purpose of the controls."
2. The Public Utility Investment Standard
In Baker,0 a California trial court adopted a measure of prop-
erty value similar to that commonly employed in public utility law.
Property invested in a public utility is assigned a value for the pur-
poses of computing a return equal to the property's fair market value
at the time it was dedicated to public use.' The Baker trial court
determined that an appropriate measure of a landlord's property is
its fair market value as of the roll-back date7 1 identified in the rent
control ordinance, adjusted for the effects of inflation from the roll-
back date to the date of enactment of the rent control law.7 3
Proponents of the Public Utility Investment Standard contend
that use of value set at the roll back date avoids the circularity
problems of a pure Market Value Standard. 4 In choosing a roll-
back date, rent boards seek to identify the last time at which the
rental market was in equilibrium. 75 Value as of the roll-back date,
proponents contend, would not reflect increased value due to the
housing shortage that the rent control law sought to remedy.7 Pro-
ponents of this standard reason that it protects a landlord from loss
of value due to the effect of inflation, yet prevents value from in-
creasing due to the imbalance in the marketplace.77
The Public Utility Investment Standard is flawed in two signifi-
cant respects. First, utility law is concerned with fixing a rate that
68. Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 288-89, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31. See also Troy Hills,
68 N.J. at 624, 350 A.2d at 44.
69. Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 288-89, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
70. 181 Cal. App. 3d at 979-80, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 759. See supra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text.
71. But cf Southern California Gas Co., 23 Cal. 3d at 474, 591 P.2d at 36, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 12.
72. Upon the enactment of rent controls, rents are commonly "rolled back" to a date
when the market was perceived to be in equilibrium. This date is identified as the "roll-back
date." Rents at the roll-back date are then adjusted to compensate for inflation during the
period between the roll-back date and the enactment of controls. See, e.g., TENANTS RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at § 10 (1982); SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA, MUNICIPAL RENT CONTROL
ORDINANCE, art. XIII, § 1804(b). See generally Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 166-67, 550 P.2d at
1027-28, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
73. 181 Cal. App. 3d at 979-80, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 759-60.
74. Respondent's Brief, supra note 48, at 61.
75. See MOSKOVITZ, supra note 61, at § 9.25.
76. Respondent's Brief, supra note 48, at 61.
77. Id.
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ensures economic efficiency in the operation of the public utility."
The sole task of the constitutional standard for measuring the land-
lord's return, however, is to determine the lowest constitutionally
permissible rate.7 Second, rental property is not "dedicated" for
public use. Rent control laws regulate the private economic activity
of a landlord. The California Supreme Court expressed similar res-
ervations about drawing an analogy between utility and rent law in
Fisher. "
A final criticism of the Public Utility Investment Standard con-
cerns the complexity of its application. The standard requires a de-
termination of the fair market value of the rental property as of the
roll-back date. Often this calculation requires costly and complicated
comparisons of sales of comparable properties years before the actual
time of litigation. The reasoning of the concurring opinion in Troy
Hills v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills" is
compelling:
A local rent control agency of typically in expert part-time peo-
ple, . . . needs simple, practical and inexpensively adminis-
trable rules . . . Such an agency would be ill served by resort to
the complex, cumbersome, expensive and, I think, largely irrele-
vant techniques, procedures, and theoretical basis of the public
utility rate field."'
3. The Return on Investment Standard
The Return on Investment Standard, as commonly employed by
Rent Boards, computes a landlord's return based on his investment
in cash, or cash equivalents, in the rental property. 8
In Fisher the California Supreme Court held that Berkeley's
78. Troy Hills, 68 N.J. at 622, 350 A.2d at 43.
79. Id. The court stated:
However, because of the fundamental differences in the nature of the property
involved and the purposes of the regulations, public utility precedents are of
only limited value to the field of rent control. In particular, it should be noted
that constitutional challenges to rent leveling ordinances are not rate fixing
cases. Courts should not be concerned with balancing competing interests in
determining what is the "best" rate level. Rather, their sole task is to determine
the lowest constitutionally permissible rate.
Id.
80. 37 Cal. 3d at 681, 693 P.2d at 291, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
81. 68 N.J. 604, 350 A.2d 34 (1974).
82. Id. at 635, 350 A.2d at 50-51.
83. See Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35
RUTGERS U.L. REV. 723, 792-805 (1983). See also MOSKOvITZ, supra note 61, at § 9.65.
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''return on investment standard" was sufficiently flexible to permit
non-confiscatory returns.84 The court identified, however, several
drawbacks with using a standard based on a landlord's investment to
measure returns. To begin with, the court observed that strict appli-
cation of an investment standard would freeze the returns of many
landlords at levels recognized when rent controls were imposed.88
The ordinance survived the landlord's facial attack because it al-
lowed the rent board to increase a landlord's investment figure or his
permitted rate of return. By making adjustments as necessary, the
court reasoned, the rent board could avoid confiscatory results.""
The Fisher court also recognized the difficulty in ascertaining a
landlord's investment when property is acquired with little or no
cash. This problem would arise when property is purchased without
a cash down payment and subsequently improved with pre-inflation
dollars, or is acquired through gift or inheritance. The court con-
cluded, however, that the ordinance did not preclude the board from
considering factors such as a landlord's p~rsonal labor, or the trans-
feror's investment, which would allow a more accurate approxima-
tion of value.8
The fundamental problem with the investment standard, as il-
lustrated by Fisher, is that it will necessarily produce confiscatory
results unless significant adjustments are provided for and made.88
The purpose of the constitutional standard, however, is to judge the
adequacy of an individual landlord's return produced by the admin-
istrative method a rent board chooses to set rents.89
4. The Net Operating Income Method
The Net Operating Income Method presumes that the rent
charged by a landlord on the roll-back date provided a fair return.
The NOIM attempts to preserve the landlord's fair return by adjust-
ing rents annually, usually by a fraction of the Consumer Price
Index.9
The NOIM fails as a constitutional measure of rents because it
is based on the initial presumption that the returns permitted on a
84. 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (illustration by example
of how a long-term investor's returns may be frozen).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 685, 693 P.2d at 293-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
87. Id.
88. Respondent's Brief, supra note 48, at 56-57.
89. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
90. See Baar, supra note 83, at 809-16. See also MOSKOVITZ, supra note 61, at § 9.45.
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given date were constitutionally adequate.9 ' The constitutional stan-
dard, however, must provide a measure by which a landlord can re-
but the presumption that his base rent is fair. The Fisher court
found that the Berkeley NOIM was facially constitutional because it
contained adjustment mechanisms which, if applied properly, would
allow a board to avoid confiscatory results."2 As noted in the discus-
sion of the Investment Standard, a standard for measuring returns
that depends on proper administration by a rent board is unwork-
able as a constitutional standard.9
B. Summary
The Market Value Standard, Public Utility Investment Stan-
dard, Return on Investment Standard and Net Operating Income
Method all contain flaws that render them unworkable as a constitu-
tional measure of a landlord's return. The Market Value Standard
contains circular reasoning. The Public Utility Investment Standard
is based on utility law precedents, which are of little value in setting
a minimum level of return because utility law is concerned with
finding economically optimal rates, rather than rates that would be
constitutionally permissible. Both the Investment Standard and the
Net Operating Income Method rely on proper administration by
rent boards to prevent confiscatory results. As such, they provide lit-
tle help in measuring whether the administrative method chosen by a
rent board actually produced acceptable results. The section that fol-
lows will define a standard based on the assessed tax value of a land-
lord's property, which this comment concludes is the best measure of
a landlord's return.
IV. THE ASSESSED VALUE STANDARD
A. General Application
The Assessed Value Standard proposed by this comment assigns
to a landlord's property a value equal to the assessed value recog-
nized by local government for tax purposes. Put simply, this stan-
dard would compare the assessed value, multiplied by the rate of
return permitted by a rent board, with the actual return the landlord
currently receives. Proof that a rent board has assigned a value to
property below its assessed value would entitle a landlord to relief.
91. Respondent's Brief, supra note 48, at 66.
92. 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 292-93, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
93. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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For example, assume a landlord purchased his building in 1965
for $50,000. The same building now has a current value of $200,000
and is assessed at $150,000. Further, assume the local rent board
allows landlords a ten percent return on their investment. Using the
Assessed Value Standard for measuring fair return, the landlord's
minimum constitutional return would equal $15,000 (ten percent of
$150,000). A return of $5,000 (ten percent of the landlord's invest-
ment) would be constitutionally deficient. By the same token, if the
landlord requested a return of $20,000, based on the current market
value of his property, his request would be denied.
B. Property Assessment in California
The Assessed Value Standard is particularly attractive for use
in California due to the unique manner in which California assesses
property. Proposition 13, adopted by California voters in 1978, rede-
fined the manner in which property is assessed. 4 Assessed value in
California is based on the property's fair market value in 1975."
The 1975 base value is increased each year by the lesser of the rise
in the consumer price index or two percent." Property is reassessed
only upon purchase, new construction or a change in ownership.97
94. CAL. CONST art. XIII A, §§ 1, 2 provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property
shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The
one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according
to law to the districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem
taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on (1)
any indebtedness approved on or after July 1, 1978, by two-thirds of the votes
cast by the voters voting on the proposition.
Section 2. (a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of real
property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under 'full cash value' or, thereafter,
the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or a
change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All real property
not already assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to
reflect that valuation ...
(b) The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate
not to exceed 2 percent (2%) for any given year or reduction as shown in the
consumer price index or comparable data for the area under taxing
jurisdiction. ...
Id. For a general discussion of the social and economic impact of Proposition 13, see D.
DOERR, THE PROPERTY TAX FOUR YEARS AFTER PROPOSITION 13, ASSEMBLY REVENUE
AND TAXATION COMMITTEE REPORT FOR JOINT COMMITrEE INTERIM HEARING, at 2
(1982).
95. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 110.1 (West Supp. 1987).
96. Id.
97. Id. For a discussion of how the Assessed Value Standard applies to property reas-
sessed after purchase or a change in ownership, see infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
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Although assessed value is initially based on fair market value,
all subsequent increases in assessed value are limited to two percent,
a figure deemed reasonable by the voters of California. Because in-
creases in assessed value are limited by statute, the assessed value of
property is insulated from forces in the rental market, such as scar-
city, that increase the actual market value of rental property. Thus,
the circularity problem associated with the Market Value Standard
is eliminated.'
The Assessed Value Standard would also efficiently resolve the
"inflation" issue left open in Fisher." The Fisher court concluded
that an ordinance that allows no adjustment for inflation would ulti-
mately produce confiscatory results. The court declined to state,
however, what adjustment for inflation is constitutionally required.
The Assessed Value Standard would afford landlords protection
against inflation only to the extent that they are unprotected for tax
purposes. Each year, assuming the rate of inflation equals or exceeds
two percent, landlords would be eligible for a two percent increase in
property value to reflect the increase in their tax liability caused by
inflation.
C. Application of the Assessed Value Standard in Other
Jurisdictions
In City of Miami v. Forte Towers, Inc., °° the Florida Supreme
Court rejected a rent adjustment standard based on assessed value.
The court concluded that the standard would deprive landlords of a
fair return on the value of their property.1 °1 The court based its
opinion on evidence that indicated that despite a requirement that
property be assessed at 100% of current market value, the average
assessment in Miami reflected only 75% of the property's actual
value.102 The court concluded that an ordinance based on assessed
value would produce confiscatory results because landlords would be
deprived a return that reflected the actual market value of their
property.
As noted previously, the notion that returns must reflect market
98. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
99. 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 291-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
100. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974). The Miami ordinance rejected by the Florida Supreme
Court based return on assessed value as of 1973. The ordinance allowed landlords a net an-
nual return of six percent on this value. Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 769.
102. Id.
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value has been rejected by all recent rent control decisions.1 03 The
Florida Supreme Court based its decision on the assumption that
return on value was constitutionally required. The California Su-
preme Court in Fisher held that such a standard was not constitu-
tionally required.104
The New Jersey Supreme Court criticized the Assessed Value
Standard in Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee,"" reasoning that such
a standard would involve the same circularity problems caused by
applying a market value standard because rental property is often
assessed through methods based on the property's income stream.'06
As noted, in California property is assessed based on its value in
1975, adjusted two percent per year to reflect the effects of inflation.
Although the initial assessment reflects market value, the present as-
sessed value reflects a value independent of the forces of the market-
place. The assessed value in 1975 operates much like a "roll back
date." It reflects a value insulated from the housing shortages of the
late 1970's. As such, returns would be unaffected by the market
forces that produced the inflated rents that controls seek to remedy.
D. The Assessed Value Standard as Applied to Property After
Purchase or a Change in Ownership
This comment concludes that the fairness of rents paid by te-
nants living in a building that is sold must be calculated according to
the assessed value of the building before it's sale. As noted previ-
ously, in California, property is reassessed upon purchase or a
change in ownership. For reasons described below, this comment
concludes that new owners should be permitted to increase rents to
reflect "reassessed value" only after apartments are voluntarily107
vacated.
If the fairness of rent received from existing tenants by a new
owner is measured according to reassessed value, a new owner may
be entitled to immediate rent increases.' 0 8 Allowing such increases
would defeat two commonly stated goals of rent control: (1) the need
103. See supra notes 64-67.
104. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
105. 78 N.J. at 209-10, 394 A.2d at 70.
106. Id. at 209, 394 A.2d at 70.
107. Landlords would not be permitted to raise rents after evicting tenants (without
good cause), or otherwise pressuring tenants to leave.
108. If the previous owner was actually receiving a return above the constitutional re-
turn merited by the pre-sale assessed value of his property, reassessment of the property may
not result in rent increases.
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to protect long-term tenants living on fixed incomes; and (2) the dis-
couragement of speculative property transfers by landlords." 9
Rent controls seek to protect low income renters who would be
forced to move out of their homes by rising rents."' If a new owner
is permitted to raise rents as soon as his property is reassessed to
current market value, tenants unable to afford higher rents would be
forced to relocate. Measuring the fairness of rents according to pre-
sale assessed value would prevent immediate increases, thus protect-
ing low income tenants.
Measuring rents according to pre-sale assessed value would also
discourage speculative property transfers. Many cities, in enacting
control ordinances, have identified speculative purchases of rental
property as a cause of inflated rents.111 If rents are measured accord-
ing to reassessed value, thus permitting immediate rent increases, the
new owner would be willing to pay more for a building than he
would if the building's income was restricted to the previous con-
trolled level.' 12 The result would be inflated property values and
ever increasing rents.
This comment concludes that the fairness of rent received from
a tenant should be measured by the assessed value of the property at
the time the tenant agrees to rent a unit. Rent paid by existing te-
nants would be unaffected by a subsequent sale and reassessment.
However, as units are voluntarily vacated after a sale, the new
owner would be allowed to increase the rent of the vacated unit to
reflect the building's current assessed value.
Applying the Assessed Value Standard in this manner would
force potential buyers to take into account current limitations upon
the building's income imposed by rent controls. Should he choose to
invest in the building, he does so knowing that his return will be
based upon the building's pre-sale assessed value. A landlord, how-
ever, should not be expected to accept returns based on the previous
owner's tax base indefinitely. As units become vacant, it is fair to
allow him to charge new tenants rents based on the value used to
determine his current tax liability.
109. See MOSKOVITZ, supra note 61, at § 9.2.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA, MUNICIPAL RENT CONTROL ORDI-
NANCE, art. XIII, § 1800 (1985).
112. In Troy Hills, the court stated that, "rent levels may permissibly . . . preclude
persons who have paid inflated purchase prices for buildings from recovering a fair return." 68
N.J. at 628, 350 A.2d at 47.
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E. Summary
The Assessed Value Standard is easy to use and produces re-
sults that are fair. Assessed value is a matter of public record. To
determine a landlord's constitutionally permissible return, a board
need only look up his assessed value and multiply it by the rate of
return permitted by the rent board.
In addition, the results produced by the Assessed Value Stan-
dard are equitable. Local governments are precluded from defining
one value of property for purposes of determining its own tax in-
come, and another when defining a landlord's permissible return. By
the same token, landlords will be unable to assert their returns are
confiscatory when they pay taxes on a value below that alleged nec-
essary to receive a fair return.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has yet to define the constitu-
tional standard by which it will measure the sufficiency of a land-
lord's return. The court identified the need for a standard in Fisher,
but concluded it would be improper to define a standard until it was
faced with a challenge to rent control as applied.
This comment defines a standard that links permissible return
to a landlord's property tax liability. The standard applies a value to
the landlord's property for rent purposes equal to the value upon
which a landlord's taxes are based. In cases where property is reas-
sessed due to a purchase or a change in ownership, the assessed
value of the property prior to sale is used to measure the fairness of
rent received from tenants in occupation at the time of the ownership
change.
In the absence of a clearly defined constitutional measure of fair
return, disputes between landlords and local rent boards will flour-
ish. Landlords desiring higher rents will take their grievances to
court. The Assessed Value Standard proposed by this comment pro-
vides a simple, efficient means for landlords and rent boards to mea-
sure the sufficiency of returns permitted by a local rent control ordi-
nance. Adoption of the Assessed Value Standard by the California
courts will serve the interests of both renters and property owners by
providing a framework for the resolution of rent disputes.
Jonathan M. Ross
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